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When a Tent is Your Castle:  
Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Searches 
of Makeshift Dwellings of Unhoused Persons 
Evanie Parr 
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all 
the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may 
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England 
cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the  
threshold of the ruined tenement!”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2015, police entered an unauthorized homeless 
encampment on public property in Vancouver, Washington, pursuant to a 
previously unenforced public camping ban.2 William Pippin, a resident of 
the camp, was asleep inside his makeshift dwelling—an enclosed tarp held 
up by poles and affixed to a fence.3 After the police officers woke him and 
                                                     
 J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2019. I am deeply grateful to Professors Deborah 
Ahrens and Sara Rankin and to ACLU Washington Staff Attorney Breanne Schuster for their 
enthusiastic support of this project and invaluable feedback during its evolution. Thank you also to the 
members of the Real Change Homeless Rights Advocacy Project who generously shared their stories 
with me over the past several years and whose remarkable resilience in the face of homelessness 
inspired this Note. 
 1. State v. Pippin, 403 P.3d 907, 913 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (remarks attributed to William Pitt, 
Earl of Chatham, from a 1763 debate in Parliament). 
 2. Brief of Respondent at 2, Pippin, 403 P.3d 907 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (No. 48540-1-II), 2016 
WL 8309691; Heidi Groover, Is a Tarp a Home?, STRANGER (Feb. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Tarp a 
Home?], http://www.thestranger.com/features/2017/02/15/24868979/is-a-tarp-a-home [https://perma. 
cc/N9G8-SNV3]. A homeless encampment is a group of unhoused people living outdoors in tents or 
other makeshift shelter, often finding a scintilla of safety and security in numbers. An unauthorized 
encampment is one not sanctioned by the government (if on public property) or the landowner (if on 
private property), and therefore vulnerable to police enforcement actions called “sweeps.” SAMIR 
JUNEJO, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, NO REST FOR THE 
WEARY: WHY CITIES SHOULD EMBRACE HOMELESS ENCAMPMENTS 6 (Sara K. Rankin & Susanne 
Skinner eds., 2016), https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006& 
context=hrap. 
 3. Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. 
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asked him to come out to discuss the camping ban, one officer lifted the 
tarp and saw Mr. Pippin in bed with a bag of what appeared to be 
methamphetamine next to him.4 Mr. Pippin was arrested and charged with 
possession of methamphetamine.5 
Mr. Pippin filed a motion to suppress the contraband as the fruit of a 
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution.6 The trial court granted the motion, relying on United States 
v. Sandoval,7 where a federal court held that a similarly situated defendant 
had a subjective expectation of privacy even when he was engaged in 
illegal activity and that his expectation was objectively reasonable when 
he was camping on public land without permission because he was never 
asked to vacate.8 The State of Washington appealed.9 
During the ensuing litigation, the parties argued over (among other 
things) whether Mr. Pippin’s makeshift tent was a space protected by 
either the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches 
of “houses” or the Washington State Constitution’s analogue prohibiting 
invasion of one’s “private affairs or home.”10 The Court of Appeals 
declined to analyze whether Mr. Pippin’s tent was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment or whether it should be considered a “home” per se, but it did 
find sufficient indicia of Mr. Pippin’s “private affairs” for both the tent 
and its contents to come under the purview of Article I, Section 7.11 In so 
doing, the Court of Appeals legitimized one of the most critical ways that 
                                                     
 4. Brief of Appellant at 7, Pippin, 403 P.3d 907 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (No. 48540-1-II), 2016 
WL 8309690. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 8. 
 7. United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 8. Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 8. 
 9. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 909. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; Tarp a Home?, supra note 2. 
 11. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 917. The court noted that while Article I, Section 7 provides greater 
protection than the federal Constitution in some areas, Washington courts may rely on the reasoning 
of federal courts and other jurisdictions when analyzing an issue of first impression regarding the 
scope of Article I, Section 7. Id. at 911–12. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court 
reversed the suppression order on other grounds and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 917. 
First, it held that the warrantless search was not justified by the protective sweep exception because 
the officers had not yet decided whether or not to arrest Mr. Pippin for violating the public camping 
ordinance at the time they opened the tent. Id. Second, it found that the lower court had improperly 
applied a balancing test to determine whether an exigency exception for officer safety was satisfied, 
and that the factual record was insufficient to make that determination. Id. Finally, it held that two 
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. The court remanded to the trial court 
to assess exigent circumstances of officer safety under the proper legal standard and to enter additional 
findings of fact. Id. 
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people experiencing homelessness12 strive to retain some sense of dignity 
and humanity: by establishing makeshift dwellings.13 The court also 
rightfully shifted its constitutional evaluation from “reasonable 
expectations of privacy”—based on notions of property ownership that 
reinforce the consequences of wealth and privilege—to a more equitable 
assessment of whether an individual’s “‘private affairs’ . . . have been 
unreasonably violated.”14 
This Note will argue that all jurisdictions should follow the 
Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II in validating makeshift 
dwellings used by people experiencing homelessness as spaces protected 
from unwarranted police intrusions by shifting evaluations of “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” to a more equitable standard that appreciates the 
realities of economic disparity. This approach to constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures is imperative to protect the 
rights of people experiencing homelessness, given that such individuals 
are regularly subjected to invasions of privacy and heightened exposure to 
the criminal justice system.15 
Part I of this Note will explain how the lives of people experiencing 
extreme poverty in the United States have been intensely monitored by 
government agencies, such that poor people are frequently deprived of 
basic rights afforded to their more affluent counterparts. People in poverty 
are often subjected to regular invasions of privacy by virtue of their use of 
public benefits and other evidence of financial hardship.16 Further, poor 
                                                     
 12. This Note will primarily refer to people experiencing homelessness using person-first 
language to emphasize that homelessness is a temporary experience, not an identity or status more 
significant than personhood. Common terminology like “the homeless” and even “homeless people” 
emphasize one’s current living arrangements as a person’s sole identity and can be dehumanizing. 
With that concern in mind, this Note will refer to “people experiencing homelessness,” “unhoused 
people,” and occasionally “homeless people” interchangeably when necessary for sentence flow and 
clarity, with the belief that readers will understand that homelessness is a transitory experience, not a 
sole identity. 
 13.  Heidi Groover, Appeals Court: People Who Live in Tents Have the Same Privacy 
Protections as Those in Houses, STRANGER (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.thestranger.com/slog/2017/ 
10/11/25464116/appeals-court-people-who-live-in-tents-have-the-same-privacy-protections-as-those 
-in-houses [https://perma.cc/T8JA-4G2Y]; Jessica Prokop & Patty Hastings, Court: Homeless Have 
Privacy Rights, COLUMBIAN (Oct. 10, 2017, 9:15 PM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2017/ 
oct/10/court-homeless-have-privacy-rights-man-arrested-vancouver/ [https://perma.cc/G53A-S5P7]. 
 14. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 912. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 388-400-0040, 388-406-0010, 388-418-0007, 388-490-
0005 (2018) (requiring applicants for Basic Food benefits to provide proof of income and expenses at 
the time of application and report any changes or risk losing the benefit, and to permit the Department 
of Social and Health Services to contact third parties and send fraud investigators on unannounced 
home visits to verify the recipient’s circumstances). 
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people are more heavily policed than affluent people,17 and in particular, 
basic life-sustaining activities are often criminalized for unhoused people 
who have no reasonable legal alternative but to engage in them outdoors 
or in public.18 Because poor people are subjected to more surveillance and 
policing than their wealthier counterparts, the Fourth Amendment—and 
corresponding protections arising from state constitutions—should 
provide a backstop to protect the spaces in which people experiencing 
poverty conduct their most private affairs. 
Part II of this Note will discuss how laws that criminalize visible 
poverty have been increasingly invalidated as unconstitutional. For 
example, the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibits governments from penalizing people based on their 
homeless status.19 Cities may not penalize homeless people for violating 
public camping ordinances when the city has failed to provide adequate 
alternatives.20 Additionally, laws that criminalize panhandling (or 
begging) often pose Due Process and First Amendment problems based on 
overbreadth, vagueness, prior restraints, and content-based restrictions 
that cannot survive strict scrutiny.21 It follows, then, that if unhoused 
people cannot be subjected to criminal sanctions for living outside or 
engaging in constitutionally protected speech while visibly poor, they 
should not be deprived of constitutional protections against unreasonable 
searches because of the same status. 
                                                     
 17. Lindsay J. Gus, The Forgotten Residents: Defining the Fourth Amendment “House” to the 
Detriment of the Homeless, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 769, 770 (2016) (noting that homeless individuals 
are overrepresented in prison populations). 
 18. See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES (2014) [hereinafter NO SAFE PLACE], 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/9GMT-GCSE] (describing laws 
that criminalize camping, sleeping, begging, loitering, sitting, lying down, sleeping in vehicles, sharing 
food, and storing belongings in public). 
 19. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that 
“the City’s practice of arresting homeless individuals for performing inoffensive conduct in public 
when they have no place to go is cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment” and seizure 
of the personal property of people experiencing homelessness violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 20. See Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 4:17-CV-1473, 2017 WL 3605238, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
22, 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order enjoining the city from enforcing its public camping 
ban because “[t]he evidence is conclusive that [the unsheltered plaintiffs] are involuntarily in public, 
harmlessly attempting to shelter themselves—an act they cannot realistically forgo, and that is integral 
to their status as unsheltered homeless individuals. Enforcement of the City’s ban against the plaintiffs 
may, therefore, cause them irreparable harm by violating their Eighth Amendment right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment due to their status of ‘homelessness’”). 
 21. See generally DREW SENA & JOCELYN TILLISCH, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS 
RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, BEGGING FOR CHANGE: BEGGING RESTRICTIONS THROUGHOUT 
WASHINGTON (Sara K. Rankin & Justin Olson eds., 2018) [hereinafter BEGGING FOR CHANGE], https: 
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173191; Drew Sena, Note, A Constitutional Critique 
on the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 287 (2017). 
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Part III of this Note will argue that Fourth Amendment protections—
whether grounded in property rights or privacy rights—both historically 
and currently fail to recognize the rights of people with lesser economic or 
social status. Fourth Amendment protections based in property rights serve 
people with more economic privilege to the detriment of historically 
disadvantaged groups, such as working-class people, people of color, and 
women.22 Even more recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, based on 
expectations of privacy, fails to grant protections to people who cannot 
afford to erect walls and put space between themselves and the rest of 
society.23 
Part IV of this Note will evaluate the Pippin court’s “private affairs” 
analysis as a more judicious and equitable approach to assess unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Given how property- and privacy-based 
justifications for protecting certain spheres from unreasonable invasions 
have been applied narrowly to preserve systems of power and privilege, 
Division II was correct to acknowledge that an unhoused person’s 
makeshift dwelling represents that person’s “private affairs” protected by 
the Washington State Constitution and that a person does not lose that 
protection by virtue of their unsheltered status.24 All jurisdictions should 
follow Division II in recognizing the dwellings of unhoused people as 
spaces protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and by 
corresponding provisions in state constitutions. 
                                                     
 22. David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 
192 (2002). (“[R]ich people have bigger and more comfortable homes than poor people; it is therefore 
much easier for rich people than for poor people to stay home when engaged in activities they wish to 
keep private. Granting homes more privacy than other places therefore tilts Fourth Amendment 
protection in favor of the rich and against the poor, who are forced to conduct much of their lives 
outside of their residences.”); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1709, 1713 (1993) (arguing that “American law has recognized a property interest in whiteness”); 
Marc L. Roark, Under-Propertied Persons, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9 (2017) (“Property as 
the vehicle for identity-making activities affords owners with enhanced privacy against outside 
scrutiny so that they are able to expose themselves to the world on their own terms.”). 
 23. See Elizabeth Schutz, The Fourth Amendment Rights of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1003, 1020–28 (1992) (applying Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy to “temporary homes” 
for overnight guests, hotel patrons, squatters, and unhoused people living in makeshift homes). 
 24. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; State v. Pippin, 403 P.3d 907, 915 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (“The 
law is meant to apply to the real world, and the realities of homelessness dictate that dwelling places 
are often transient and precarious. The temporary nature of Pippin’s tent does not undermine any 
privacy interest. . . . Nor does the flimsy and vulnerable nature of an improvised structure leave it less 
worthy of privacy protections. For the homeless, those may often be the only refuge for the private in 
the world as it is.”) (internal citations omitted). Under the case law above, Mr. Pippin’s tent was the 
sort of closed-off space that typically shelters the intimate and discrete details of personal life protected 
by Article I, Section 7. 
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I. POOR PEOPLE’S LIVES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY SURVEILLED 
Fourth Amendment protections for dwelling spaces must be fiercely 
protected because poor people otherwise face disproportionate 
surveillance in countless aspects of their lives. Unlike their wealthier 
counterparts, people experiencing poverty are often compelled to sacrifice 
their claims to privacy as a tradeoff to getting their basic needs met. People 
experiencing homelessness also face potential criminal penalties when 
they publicly engage in activities that are necessary for survival instead of 
in the privacy of a home; the ability to sleep, urinate, or defecate in the 
privacy of one’s own home is what saves housed people from the same 
criminal sanctions.25 Because unhoused people face this kind of constant 
public surveillance, the Fourth Amendment is a critical backstop to protect 
against invasions into their dwellings. 
A. Lack of Privacy 
Poor people are regularly denied privacy as a consequence of living 
with very limited means. For example, people who receive public benefits 
like welfare assistance uniformly may do so only by agreeing to disclose 
information about their household composition, income, and other 
resources at the time of application and throughout the period in which 
they receive benefits.26 Departments of social and health services may 
even send fraud investigators to make unannounced visits to welfare 
recipients, intruding into homes to verify that a particular person’s poverty 
is sufficient to remain eligible for a meager allowance to put food on the 
table.27 This dynamic has been described as a legitimate “waiver of 
privacy,” despite the fact that welfare recipients have zero bargaining 
power against administrative agencies on this issue and must agree to these 
conditions or forego the benefit altogether.28 Since welfare is not 
considered an entitlement, recipients are understood to have waived any 
                                                     
 25. See JUSTIN OLSON & SCOTT MACDONALD, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY PROJECT, WASHINGTON’S WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING 
ORDINANCES & THEIR ENFORCEMENT (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2602318 
[https://perma.cc/E62D-RJXR] (summarizing city ordinances in Washington State that prohibit 
engaging in life-sustaining activities like sitting, standing, sleeping, urinating, or defecating in public 
places). 
 26. See sources cited supra note 16. 
 27. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-490-0005 (2018); Tracie McMillan, The SNAP Gap: Benefits 
Aren’t Enough to Keep Many Recipients Fed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:57 PM), https:// 
www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/03/03/468955099/the-snap-gap-benefits-arent-enough-to-keep-
many-recipients-fed [https://perma.cc/3LHL-Z5FN]. 
 28. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 
1579 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE 
HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994) and JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM 
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)). 
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claim to privacy regarding their means and morality when they accepted 
public assistance.29 
People living in such extreme poverty that they cannot afford 
housing sacrifice further privacy protections when they stay in emergency 
homeless shelters or live on the street. Many homeless shelters are 
arranged as “congregate” shelters: large open rooms where numerous 
individuals sleep with others nearby with no private space to themselves.30 
Similarly, bathrooms are often shared spaces in homeless shelters, 
affording little to no privacy for the intimate act of bathing.31 Moreover, 
some shelters “require that homeless people consent to the search of their 
personal effects” as a condition of entry.32 In fact, many homeless people 
have listed a lack of privacy as a primary reason for not returning to a 
shelter.33 
While living on the streets often means an even greater lack of 
privacy as compared to living in a shelter, some unhoused people erect 
tents on city sidewalks, in alleys, under freeway overpasses, and in under-
utilized green spaces.34 When unhoused people live in tents—either alone, 
in pairs, or in larger encampments—the tents provide some greater degree 
of privacy over shelters. While quarters may still be incredibly close, 
individuals at least have one’s own space and a door to create some 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 1580. Moreover, public benefit recipients effectively have no mechanism to change 
this radical imbalance of power because changes in public benefits administration are not subject to 
the notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedures Act. 
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012). 
 30. SUZANNE SKINNER, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, 
SHUT OUT: HOW BARRIERS OFTEN PREVENT MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY SHELTER 29 
(Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016), https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1004&context=hrap [https://perma.cc/G5LX-M8KF]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS: THE CASE 
FOR HOMELESS BILL OF RIGHTS LEGISLATION 9 (2014) [hereinafter FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS], 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Wrongs_to_Rights_HBOR [https://perma.cc/FH5G-UCNV]. 
 33. TAI DUNSON-STRANE & SARAH SOAKAI, UNIV. OF HAW. AT MANOA, THE EFFECT OF CITY 
SWEEPS AND SIT-LIE POLICIES ON HONOLULU’S HOUSELESS 20 (2015), http://blog.hawaii.edu/durp/ 
files/2015/06/Houseless-Honolulu-Report.small_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VBE-4X6L]. 
 34. JUNEJO, supra note 2, at 6. Alternatively, some unhoused people use vehicles as temporary 
shelter, but face additional obstacles and potential traffic penalties associated with sleeping in and 
parking a car over extended periods of time. JESSICA SO, SCOTT MACDONALD, JUSTIN OLSON & RYAN 
MANSELL, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, LIVING AT THE 
INTERSECTION: LAWS AND VEHICLE RESIDENCY (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016) (surveying Washington 
State laws that criminalize vehicle residency), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2776423. For a discussion of safe parking programs designed to mitigate harm to vehicle residents in 
Washington and California, see T. RAY IVEY & JODILYN GILLELAND, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW 
HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: FINDING SAFE PARKING FOR 
VEHICLE RESIDENTS (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3173221. See also T. Ray Ivey, The Criminalization of Vehicle Residency and the Case for Judicial 
Intervention Via the Washington State Homestead Act, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 243, 247 (2018). 
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semblance of privacy.35 Yet, unhoused people are often subject to 
sweeps—police actions to remove homeless encampments, often resulting 
in the unconstitutional seizure and destruction of personal property36—
such that the limited privacy provided in a tent or makeshift shelter is 
precarious, at best.37 
Recognizing the dubious status of constitutional and human rights 
for unhoused people, American homeless advocates have called for 
federal, state, and local governments to establish affirmative protections 
for the rights of people experiencing homelessness. The National Law 
Center on Homelessness and Poverty, for example, has appealed to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council on the issue of privacy rights for 
unhoused people in the United States: 
Article 17 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which the U.S. has ratified, states “no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence . . . .” However, the more than 3.5 
million people who experience homelessness in the United States 
annually are forced to exist partially or fully in the public sphere, 
where they “have to face a consistent suspicion and scrutiny because 
they are consistently visible.” . . . We call on the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Privacy to affirm that people experiencing 
homelessness are entitled to the same level of privacy in whatever 
“home” they have access to, whether it be a shanty, a tent, a tarp, or 
just a blanket, as a regularly housed person would expect in their 
home . . . .38 
Similarly, several states have passed “Homeless Bill of Rights” 
legislation enumerating a right to a “reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding personal property” for people experiencing homelessness.39 
That advocates have made calls for such legislation is evidence that the 
privacy rights of people experiencing homelessness have not been 
sufficiently protected. 
                                                     
 35. JUNEJO, supra note 2, at 13; Telephone Interview with Paul Boden, Exec. & Org. Dir., 
Western Reg’l Advocacy Project (Oct. 31, 2017). 
 36. See Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the city’s practice of seizing and destroying the belongings of 
homeless people during sweeps because “unabandoned property of homeless persons is not beyond 
the reach of the protections enshrined in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”); JUNEJO, supra 
note 2, at 15–20. 
 37. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
FOR PERSONS EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO THE SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (2017) [hereinafter REPORT ON RIGHT TO PRIVACY], https: 
//www.nlchp.org/documents/Special-Rapporteur-Right-to-Privacy [https://perma.cc/QQ42-C3F4]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 10. 
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B. Criminalization 
Perhaps more egregious than the regular invasions of privacy 
suffered by unhoused people is the increased criminalization of the 
experience of homelessness. Loitering laws that make “it a crime to 
wander without visible means of support” and laws that criminalize 
vagrancy date back to the founding of this country and beyond.40 While 
criminalization laws have evolved to target different groups of 
“undesirable people” at different points during American history,41 they 
represent a pattern of controlling public space and excluding classes of 
people deemed undesirable to the community.42 
This tradition has continued today, as numerous cities and 
municipalities continue to criminalize life-sustaining activities43 when 
undertaken in public by people experiencing homelessness. While laws 
that prohibit sitting in certain public spaces44 are often justified as 
protecting the public interest by maintaining “unobstructed walkways” or 
promoting the economic health of the community, advocates have 
described these justifications as “dubious” and the laws as expensive and 
ineffective.45 Similarly, laws that criminalize urination and defecation in 
public46 are often justified as protecting public health and safety, but they 
neglect to consider the health and safety of the individuals who have no 
other place to relieve themselves.47 
                                                     
 40. Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1203, 1206 (1953); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of 
Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 634 (1992). 
 41. JAVIER ORTIZ & MATTHEW DICK, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY PROJECT, THE WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY: A COMPARISON OF MODERN AND HISTORICAL 
CRIMINALIZATION LAWS 2–11 (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015) (comparing vagrancy laws, anti-Okie laws, 
Jim Crow laws, ugly laws, and sundown town laws). 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (defining life-sustaining 
activities as including eating, sleeping, and sitting). 
 44. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 12A.12.015, 15.48.040, 18.12.250 (2018). 
 45. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 18, at 16. 
 46. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.10.100. 
 47. Jerry Large, Fear of Our Own Desperation Gets in the Way of Homelessness Solutions, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 22, 2016, updated May 23, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/fear-of-our-own-desperation-gets-in-the-way-of-homelessness-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JXW8-YXDW] (“We tend to blame poor people for their own poverty. . . . We associate them with 
criminality, we look at them through this lens of evaluating them based on their perceived impact on 
our public health and safety. We don’t think about their public health and safety.” (quoting Professor 
Sara Rankin, Director, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project)); see also EVANIE 
PARR, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: 
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORIZED ENCAMPMENTS, pt. I(D) (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2018) 
[hereinafter IT TAKES A VILLAGE], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173224. 
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Moreover, recent data suggests that laws that criminalize 
homelessness are on the rise.48 
Since people experiencing homelessness frequently face criminal 
sanctions for daily survival activities, it is therefore crucial that police be 
restrained from invading into the privacy to which all people are 
constitutionally entitled—at minimum.49 Yet, police invasions into the 
spaces occupied by unhoused people are a regular occurrence. Police raids 
or sweeps of homeless encampments are the default response to 
homelessness in most communities; rather than building more affordable 
housing and providing accessible services, cities send in their armed police 
force to forcibly remove poor people from their outdoor homes.50 
II. COURTS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO RECOGNIZE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST BURDENS ON UNHOUSED PEOPLE 
Increasingly, courts have struck down laws that criminalize 
homelessness on a variety of constitutional bases. For example, in Jones 
v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a city ordinance that 
prohibited sitting, lying, or sleeping on a “street, sidewalk or other public 
way” (other than “while attending or viewing any parade”)51 because it 
                                                     
 48. See OLSON & MACDONALD, supra note 25, at 2–3 (quantifying the increase of laws that 
criminalize homelessness in Washington State); NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 18, at 8–9; Gale Holland 
& Christine Zhang, Huge Increase in Arrests of Homeless in L.A.—But Mostly for Minor Offenses, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-homeless-arrests-20180204-
story.html [https://perma.cc/8Y4K-5UZN] (noting a significant rise in arrests of homeless people for 
violating Los Angeles’s “quality-of-life” laws—restricting sleeping on the sidewalk, living in a car or 
low-level drug possession, for example—that police enforce against homeless people, usually with a 
citation and for “failure to appear in court for an unpaid citation”). 
 49. This point is particularly salient in the context of criminal law because the Constitution 
protects all persons, even those suspected of serious crimes. One of the protections afforded under the 
Constitution is the right to avoid unreasonable police invasions, particularly into the home; but when 
police search the homes of unhoused people, “the ‘illegal’ conduct is often merely violating a city 
ordinance,” and the scope of the invasion is therefore wildly disproportionate to the severity of the 
illegal conduct. E-mail from Breanne Schuster, Staff Attorney, ACLU, Wash. Found., to author (Aug. 
23, 2018) (on file with author). 
 50. Kevin Fagan, SF Mayor Vows that Clearing Homeless Tents from the Mission Just a Start, 
S.F. CHRONICLE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-mayor-vows-that-
clearing-homeless-tents-from-12864999.php [https://perma.cc/29XS-2BLH] (increased enforcement 
of public camping prohibitions paired with increased counseling, despite an insufficient number of 
shelter beds in San Francisco, California); Shay McAlister, Groups Outraged After Homeless Camp 
Torn Down, Personal Items Destroyed, WHAS11 (Oct. 30, 2017, updated Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.whas11.com/article/news/local/groups-outraged-after-homeless-camp-torn-down-
personal-items-destroyed/417-487329789 [https://perma.cc/R5HU-U3JY] (encampment bulldozed, 
tents and food removed and destroyed in Louisville, Kentucky); Peyton Yager, Police Raid Homeless 
Camp, KNWA (Aug. 6, 2018, updated Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nwahomepage.com/ 
news/knwa/police-raid-homeless-camp/1350064790 [https://perma.cc/Z92A-5W9M] (police raid of a 
homeless encampment at University of Arkansas). 
 51. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2018). 
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violated the Eighth Amendment rights of the unhoused residents of that 
city’s “Skid Row.”52 The court recognized that the number of unhoused 
people in the county astronomically exceeded the number of available 
shelter beds53 and that the unhoused plaintiffs had “no access to private 
spaces” and were “‘unable to stay off the streets’” to comply with the 
ordinance.54 Without deciding that homelessness was a cognizable status 
for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment per se, the court held that 
“involuntariness of the act or condition the City criminalizes is the critical 
factor delineating a constitutionally cognizable status” and that the utter 
lack of available shelter rendered the plaintiffs’ presence in public 
involuntary.55 More recently, in Martin v. City of Boise, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the principle in Jones, reasoning that a similar ordinance in Boise, 
Idaho, violated the Eighth Amendment by imposing “criminal penalties 
for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless 
individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”56 Notably, the Martin court 
acknowledged the consequence of shelter services with mandatory 
religious focuses as a functional barrier to access, which creates a First 
Amendment problem as well.57 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas granted a temporary restraining order enjoining 
the city of Houston from enforcing its public camping ban as it violated 
the Eighth Amendment as applied to unhoused individuals “involuntarily 
in public, harmlessly attempting to shelter themselves.”58 
                                                     
 52. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated due to settlement, 
505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 53. Id. at 1122. 
 54. Id. at 1136. 
 55. Id. at 1132 (“The City could not expressly criminalize the status of homelessness by making 
it a crime to be homeless without violating the Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are 
an integral aspect of that status. Because there is substantial and undisputed evidence that the number 
of homeless persons in Los Angeles far exceeds the number of available shelter beds at all times, 
including on the nights of their arrest or citation, Los Angeles has encroached upon Appellants’ Eighth 
Amendment protections by criminalizing the unavoidable act of sitting, lying, or sleeping at night 
while being involuntarily homeless.”). 
 56. Martin v. City of Boise, No. 15-35845, 2018 WL 4201159, at *13 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2018). 
 57. Id. at *7 (“A city cannot, via the threat of prosecution, coerce an individual to attend religion-
based treatment programs consistently with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”) 
(citing Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also SKINNER, supra note 30, at 
10–12; IT TAKES A VILLAGE, supra note 47, at 4 (citing requirements to participate in religious 
activities as one reason some individuals avoid shelters). 
 58. Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 4:17-CV-1473, 2017 WL 3605238, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 
2017) (“The evidence is conclusive that they are involuntarily in public, harmlessly attempting to 
shelter themselves—an act they cannot realistically forgo, and that is integral to their status as 
unsheltered homeless individuals. Enforcement of the City’s ban against the plaintiffs may, therefore, 
cause them irreparable harm by violating their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment due to their status of ‘homelessness.’”), order dissolved, No. 4:17-CV-1473, 2017 
WL 6619336 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 18-20129, 2018 WL 4172710 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 7, 2018)). Advocates and scholars have also critiqued laws that criminalize “aggressive” begging 
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Courts have also begun to recognize the rights of unhoused people to 
be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that 
the city violated the Fourth Amendment rights of unhoused plaintiffs when 
it seized and immediately destroyed their personal property. The personal 
property included “personal identification documents, birth certificates, 
medications, family memorabilia, toiletries, cell phones, sleeping bags and 
blankets”59 that the individuals “temporarily left on public sidewalks while 
[they] attended to necessary tasks such as eating, showering, and using 
restrooms,”60 which the city employees knew to be unabandoned.61 Yet, 
other courts have held that proper notice and other procedural safeguards 
might avoid a constitutional violation when government officials seize the 
belongings of unhoused people residing in public.62 
III. COURTS MUST RECOGNIZE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FOR PEOPLE  
EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS 
Traditional approaches to Fourth Amendment protections based on 
property rights and reasonable expectations of privacy fail to adequately 
address the realities of the lives of poor people and, in fact, reinforce 
systemic inequality. Although modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
focuses on the reasonable expectations of privacy test announced in Katz 
                                                     
as based on unfounded fears of visibly poor people and unlikely to pass constitutional muster. See 
BEGGING FOR CHANGE, supra note 21; Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4 
(2016); Drew Sena, Note, A Constitutional Critique on the Criminalization of Panhandling in 
Washington State, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 287 (2017). 
 59. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 60. Id. at 1024. 
 61. Id. at 1025. 
 62. Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0077RSM, 2017 WL 591112, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
14, 2017) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and for class 
certification). But see Casey Jaywork, Homeless Go to Court Over Destruction of Property During 
Sweeps, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/homeless-go-to-
court-over-destruction-of-property-during-sweeps/ [https://perma.cc/G4UQ-L8RK] (Plaintiff’s 
attorney Todd Williams argued that despite assurances to the contrary, city evictions are “inconsistent 
and unpredictable.” Referring to the city rules that ostensibly govern encampment evictions, Williams 
said, “The city is using their vagueness to drive a truck through the loopholes.”). See also Associated 
Press, Sweeps of Homeless Camps in Washington State Violated Rights, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/sweeps-of-homeless-camps-in-washington 
-state-violated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/UA8G-Q7ZD] (“Some campers had left to 
eat meals at a local shelter, then returned to find the work crews seizing their property and refusing to 
give it back. One homeless person, Terry Ellis, left a backpack at a bus stop while he offered to help 
a woman whose car had broken down. Even though he was within sight when the work crew arrived, 
the crew took it, ignoring his explanation for why he had left it there, Mr. Ellis said in court filings. 
Inside the backpack, he said, were new clothes he had been given so he could apply for a job.”). 
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v. United States,63 courts have held that “[a]t the very core of the Fourth 
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”64 However, 
individuals’ abilities to reap the benefit of the “sanctity of the home”65 is 
relative to their abilities to engage in private activities inside the home 
rather than outside of it.66 This Part reveals the flaws inherent to 
established theories of Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable searches, whether grounded in theories of property rights or 
in reasonable expectations of privacy when applied to dwellings used by 
people experiencing poverty. Further, this Part acknowledges the superior 
“private affairs” analysis in Pippin that more sensibly, realistically, and 
humanely considers privacy interests held by unhoused people. 
A. Property Rights 
Because the notion of privacy embraced in Katz centralizes one’s 
ability to sequester certain kinds of activities or information away from the 
eyes of outsiders (as in the traditional home), it is unsurprising that people 
with significant resources are best positioned to exercise the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee. Professor William Stuntz urges that 
[i]t would be foolish, perhaps reprehensible, for a society with 
patterns of criminal punishment [that disproportionately affect poor 
people and people of color] not to worry a great deal about the 
distributive effects of the rules and practices of its criminal justice 
system. . . . [W]e should worry about Fourth Amendment law, and in 
particular the way that law defines and protects privacy. Fourth 
Amendment law makes wealthier suspects better off than they 
otherwise would be, and may make poorer suspects worse off. And 
Fourth Amendment law heightens the tendency of the police to target 
the kinds of drug markets that prevail in poor black neighborhoods.67 
Fourth Amendment law reinforces this stratification not only because 
“[r]ich people have more access to those spaces than poor people,” but 
also because the relative costs of policing tactics make this distribution 
rational: 
                                                     
 63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (“My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 64. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511 (1961)). 
 65. Id. at 28. 
 66. See Sklansky, supra note 22. 
 67. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265, 1266 (1999). 
1006 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:993 
When the Fourth Amendment limits the use of a police tactic like 
house searches, it does two things: it raises the cost of using that 
tactic, and it lowers the relative cost of using other tactics that might 
be substitutes. Different kinds of crimes require different kinds of 
police tactics to ferret them out. Raising the cost of some tactics and 
lowering the cost of others thus means raising the cost of 
investigating some kinds of crimes and lowering the cost of 
investigating others. Different crimes are committed by different 
classes of criminals. As it happens, the kinds of crimes wealthier 
people tend to commit require greater invasions of privacy by the 
police to catch perpetrators. By raising the cost of the tactics that most 
intrude on privacy, Fourth Amendment law lowers the cost of other 
tactics, and those are the tactics that are most useful in uncovering 
the crimes of the poor.68 
As a result of this rational cost-benefit analysis, police searches that 
intrude on poor people are easily justified by the Fourth Amendment. 
For instance, the Supreme Court of the United States has found 
Fourth Amendment violations in scenarios where police use sense-
enhancing tools to gather information about activities within the home 
without actually crossing the threshold of a house, whereas inexpensive, 
low-tech investigation of a homeless encampment might not run afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment by the same reasoning, despite revealing just as 
intimate information.69 In Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that police 
committed an impermissible invasion by bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto 
the front porch of a house.70 Relying on common law notions of an implicit 
license for a “visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock 
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger 
longer) leave,” the Court held that canine forensic investigation fell far 
outside that common decency that “is generally managed without incident 
by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”71 There, the physical 
intrusion onto private property was sufficient to establish an unreasonable 
warrantless search, and it was Mr. Jardines’ ownership of his home and 
porch that protected him from the search. Similarly, in Kyllo v. United 
States, police engaged in an unreasonable search when they used thermal-
imaging technology to detect marijuana grow-lamps inside an apartment 
building from a vantage point across the street.72 Although the police never 
                                                     
 68. Id. at 1266–67 (emphasis in original). 
 69. Notably, the late Justice Antonin Scalia authored the majority opinions in both Kyllo and 
Jardines. Those interested in the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should consider 
how the Court’s changing composition affects the viability of arguments for a more expansive reading 
of that Amendment’s protections following his death in 2016. 
 70. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013). 
 71. Id. at 8. 
 72. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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even approached the home themselves, they nevertheless conducted a 
warrantless search because they gathered “information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”73 
In both cases, the Court relied on concepts of privacy associated with 
the traditional home that permit a person to shield their private activities 
from the eyes of the outside world. But a person who has no shelter except 
for a tent erected on public property has no grounds to object to a person 
lingering too long on the equivalent of their front porch, and police can 
detect heat or smell through the canvas walls of a tent without the aid of 
sense-enhancing technology. Because police need not resort to high-tech 
sense-enhancing tools to learn similar information about the activities 
occurring indoors when a tent is a home, officers have an incentive to 
pursue inexpensive investigative tactics against poor people who do not 
enjoy the property rights their wealthier counterparts rely on to prevent 
such searches. 
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Similarly, the reasonable expectations of privacy test announced in 
Katz is frequently rendered meaningless when applied to people 
experiencing homelessness.74 Several courts have ruled that people living 
in tents have no reasonable expectations of privacy because the individual 
had no legal right to camp at a particular location or because the common 
law curtilage framework does not support a legitimate privacy interest 
when camping.75 These cases demonstrate the fatal flaw in traditional 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in failing to deliver justice to 
economically disadvantaged people. The court in Pippin, on the other 
hand, rightfully focused its “private affairs” inquiry on the privacy interest 
itself (rather than on whether one can reasonably expect it to be respected) 
in arriving at a sensible and humane holding.76 
                                                     
 73. Id. at 34. 
 74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 75. See infra discussion accompanying notes 77–115. 
 76. State v. Pippin, 403 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (“Unlike the Fourth Amendment, 
where a search occurs if the government intrudes upon a subjective and reasonable expectation of 
privacy . . . the inquiry under article I, section 7 focuses on protecting ‘those privacy interests which 
citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent 
a warrant.’ Instead of examining whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, ‘the 
focus is whether the “private affairs” of an individual have been unreasonably violated.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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C. Unlawful Presence 
In most cases upholding warrantless searches or seizures for 
individuals living in tents, courts have relied on the fact of unlawful 
presence on public land as a bar to reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Courts reason that “a trespasser who places his property where it has no 
right to be has no right of privacy as to that property” because the 
trespasser himself has no right to remain there.77 As a trespasser is “subject 
to immediate ejectment,”78 the individual cannot “impute to himself the 
wrong done to the owner or occupant of the premises by the illegal 
search.”79 
For example, in State v. Cleator, an appellate court found that Mr. 
Cleator had no reasonable expectation of privacy inside a tent erected on 
public land without permission “because he had no right to remain on the 
property and could have been ejected at any time.”80 Police recovered 
several stolen items from Mr. Cleator’s tent, which the State used as 
evidence against Mr. Cleator in a residential burglary trial.81 Mr. Cleator 
appealed his conviction, in part, on the basis that the trial court improperly 
admitted the items as evidence because the officers seized the items 
without a warrant.82 The appellate court acknowledged that Mr. Cleator 
did have a legitimate expectation of privacy limited to his personal 
belongings but not for the tent or for the stolen items.83 The difference, the 
court reasoned, was that neither the stolen items nor the tent belonged to 
Mr. Cleator, and the tent was “a temporary, unsecured 
shelter . . . wrongfully erected on public property which was not a 
campsite.”84 The court also noted that “[n]o case has been cited nor has 
our research disclosed any authority indicating that our citizens have ever 
held unlimited privacy rights to property they wrongfully occupied.”85 
The Tenth Circuit applied a similar rationale in U.S. v. Ruckman, 
finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cave on public land 
                                                     
 77. Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1975) (quoting State v. Pokini, 367 
P.2d 499, 509 (Haw. 1961)). 
 78. Wesley C. Jackson, Life on Streets and Trails: Fourth Amendment Rights for the Homeless 
and the Homeward Bound, 66 VAND. L. REV. 933, 952 (2013). 
 79. Pokini, 367 P.2d at 510. 
 80. State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306, 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
 81. Id. at 307–08. 
 82. Id. at 308. In order to deter unlawful police conduct, courts apply the “exclusionary rule” 
that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible 
in . . . court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Thus, defendants often appeal convictions 
based on unlawful searches and seizures to prevent evidence obtained during the search or seizure 
from being used to support the charge. 
 83. Cleator, 857 P.2d at 309. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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despite indicia of a “home.”86 Although Mr. Ruckman had lived in the cave 
continuously for approximately eight months prior to the search and had 
attempted to enclose the opening of the cave,87 the court rejected the 
argument that the cave had become Mr. Ruckman’s home, holding that he 
was subject to immediate ejectment and that “the cave could hardly be 
considered a permanent residence.”88 While Mr. Ruckman may have 
subjectively considered the cave his home, the court held that such an 
expectation of privacy is not one society is prepared to accept as 
reasonable because a person “may not use public lands primarily for 
residential purposes.”89 The court found the cave on public land analogous 
to “open fields,” noting that such places do not warrant the same privacy 
protections because they “usually are accessible to the public and the 
police in ways that a home, an office or commercial structure would not 
be.”90 The court also noted that Mr. Ruckman could possibly obtain a 
privacy protection by the property-based adverse possession theory. 
However, even under that theory, because he was subject to expulsion, he 
had no such right.91 
On the other hand, resolving questions of privacy based on a 
technical status of trespass “can lead to absurd results.”92 For example, 
consider the following hypothetical: two individuals, each with a valid 
camping permit, set up tents on plots next to each other in a national park. 
Camper A has a permit for a one-night stay, and Camper B has a permit 
for a two-night stay. Each camper has a fully enclosed tent and stores some 
personal belongings in their tents. Under Ruckman, if Camper A overstays 
his permit by one minute, he could be instantaneously stripped of his 
privacy rights although his campsite is indistinguishable from Camper B’s, 
apart from the date on the permit.93 Some courts have explicitly rejected 
this sort of line drawing. In fact, the Sandoval court recognized this 
arbitrary effect by holding that camping unlawfully does not per se remove 
all privacy protections inside a tent.94 Sandoval demonstrates that some 
courts acknowledge that a mechanical application of unlawful presence 
                                                     
 86. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1473. 
 89. Id. (quoting United States v. Allen, 578 F.2d 236, 237–38 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
 90. Id.; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
 91. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472. 
 92. Id. at 1476 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
 93. See United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do not believe the 
reasonableness of [a person’s] expectation of privacy turns on whether he had permission to camp on 
public land.”). 
 94. Id. at 661 (noting that whether Mr. Sandoval was legally permitted to be on the land was a 
fact not settled by the lower court). 
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may produce unjust results, and a thorough, fact-specific analysis may be 
more appropriate when determining reasonable expectations of privacy. 
D. Curtilage 
Because a significant number of unhoused people are considered 
“unsheltered” (living on the street, in abandoned buildings, in vehicles, or 
in tents—as opposed to emergency shelters or transitional housing),95 
curtilage analysis for people living outdoors often fails in ways not typical 
of more traditional residences. Courts have defined curtilage as “the land 
immediately surrounding and associated with the home” sufficiently 
connected to the “intimate activity” of the home to warrant the same 
Fourth Amendment protections as within the home itself.96 In contrast, 
courts have defined “open fields” as publicly accessible lands. In assessing 
whether a particular area should be considered “curtilage,” courts engage 
in a fact-specific analysis of four significant factors: 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether 
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the 
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.97 
In the same vein as their application of unlawful presence, courts 
have declined to find curtilage protections for areas surrounding an 
unlawful campsite based on diminished expectations of privacy within an 
unpermitted enclosure (as opposed to lawful residences). For example, in 
State v. Pentecost, the court distinguished the area surrounding a 
trespasser’s campsite from the curtilage of a residence on the basis of 
unlawful presence, concluding that curtilage of a residence is granted a 
higher expectation of privacy because a tenant or homeowner has a power 
to exclude.98 While Mr. Pentecost may have had a limited expectation of 
privacy inside his tent, he enjoyed no such protection regarding the items 
outside his tent by virtue of his status as a trespasser.99 
                                                     
 95. ALL HOME, SEATTLE/KING COUNTY POINT-IN-TIME COUNT OF PERSONS EXPERIENCING 
HOMELESSNESS 8 (2017), http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017-King-PIT-Count-
Comprehensive-Report-FINAL-DRAFT-5.31.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEW4-UZP9] (“On the night 
of the 2017 Point-in-Time Count in Seattle/King County, there were 11,643 people experiencing 
homelessness. . . . Forty-seven percent (47%) of the population was unsheltered, living on the street, 
in parks, encampments, vehicles, or other places not meant for human habitation.”). 
 96. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 97. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 98. State v. Pentecost, 825 P.2d 365, 367 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 99. Id. at 366–67 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)) 
(Mr. Pentacost’s argument failed the second prong of the Katz test because society does not generally 
recognize a trespasser’s expectation of privacy as justified.). 
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Similarly, in People v. Nishi, a California court found no expectation 
of privacy over items underneath a tarp outside Mr. Nishi’s tent, which he 
occupied without a proper permit.100 The Nishi court considered many 
factors when determining that Mr. Nishi did not have an expectation of 
privacy, but it stated that “[t]he most significant, and ultimately 
controlling, factor in the case before us is that defendant was not lawfully 
or legitimately on the premises where the search was conducted.”101 
Again, the court acknowledged that a tent on a public campground is 
analogous to a “house, apartment, or hotel room” in terms of the activities 
and purposes for which the inside space is used, like sleeping and storing 
valuables, whereas “the remainder of [Mr. Nishi’s] unauthorized, 
undeveloped campsite was a dispersed, ill-defined site, exposed and open 
to public view”—unlike the curtilage spaces associated with traditional 
homes.102 Mr. Nishi had no lawful presence or possessory interest in the 
premises, and he had little to no “subjective expectation that it would 
remain free from governmental invasion” because officers had repeatedly 
evicted him from camping in the area in the recent past.103 Moreover, Mr. 
Nishi “had no authorization to camp within or otherwise occupy the public 
land,” so he was not “legitimately on the premises” nor had he any right 
to exclude others.104 Because the evidence seized was located outside the 
tent, the court did not reach the specific issue of whether Mr. Nishi was 
entitled to any reasonable expectation of privacy inside the tent but 
suggested that, as in Ruckman, Mr. Nishi’s status as a trespasser would 
negate any expectation of privacy.105 
So, what are we to make of the courts’ concessions that unhoused 
people do enjoy some degree of privacy, limited to their own personal 
belongings inside enclosed spaces? It appears that the fact of unlawful 
presence merely lessens the potency of the privacy protections typically 
afforded to one’s home but does not eliminate all protection. In fact, courts 
have acknowledged some privacy protections for particular spaces, 
focusing their analyses on whether the defendants could assert a legitimate 
                                                     
 100. People v. Nishi, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (failing to address whether 
the defendant’s homeless status afforded any weight to his expectation of privacy). While the land Mr. 
Nishi occupied was in fact available for camping with a permit, Mr. Nishi did not have the necessary 
permit and had apparently been cited for “illegal camping” and evicted from other areas of the preserve 
on multiple prior occasions. Id. at 889. The court found the fact of his knowing violation of the permit 
requirement significant in its conclusion that he was afforded no privacy right regarding the area 
outside his tent. Id. at 890 (relying on People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 611–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995)). 
 101. Id. at 889. 
 102. Id. at 890. 
 103. Id. at 889–90. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 890. 
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privacy claim to a less-enclosed space.106 In the tent curtilage cases, courts 
seem to conclude there is no expectation of privacy based on the 
combination of (1) the tent’s unlawful presence and (2) the lack of efforts 
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation, which is a factor 
in determining whether a space is considered curtilage to a home.107 
These distinctions lack merit when applied to the context of 
unhoused people publicly camping in urban areas for two reasons. First, 
several jurisdictions have recognized that lawfulness tests fall short of any 
notions of fairness when people are forced to live outside due to 
necessity.108 Also, local laws and ordinances that prohibit basic activities 
necessary to survival109 may fail to pass constitutional muster because they 
disproportionately burden homeless people based on status.110 
Second, curtilage analysis utterly fails when applied to the context of 
urban camping. The court in United States v. Basher applied the four 
factors111 relevant to determining whether an area is a curtilage and 
afforded Mr. Basher the same level of protection against warrantless 
searches and seizures.112 There, the court found that Mr. Basher had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the campsite, including the area 
outside the tent, because the area was “a dispersed, or undeveloped 
camping area . . . visible from the developed camping area where the 
officers had stayed the previous night.”113 
Taken in turn, the four curtilage factors upset the traditional analysis 
when applied to the context of urban camping. The first factor of proximity 
                                                     
 106. Id. at 890 (items covered by a tarp outside the tent); State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306, 309 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (personal belongings versus stolen items inside a tent); State v. Pentecost, 825 
P.2d 365, 367 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (items inside a tent versus unenclosed items outside the tent). 
Other than personal belongings as compared to stolen items, the courts do not draw these distinctions 
based on relative lawfulness; rather, the courts appear to apply the curtilage analysis independent from 
the lawfulness analysis. 
 107. United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987)). 
 108. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The City 
could not expressly criminalize the status of homelessness by making it a crime to be homeless without 
violating the Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect of that status.”), 
vacated due to settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 4:17-
CV-1473, 2017 WL 3605238 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2017). 
 109. Examples of activities that are necessary for survival include, but are not limited to, sitting, 
sleeping, and urinating. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1132. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Basher, 629 F.3d at 1169 (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301) (“[1] proximity of the area [claimed 
to be curtilage] to the home, [2] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, [3] whether the area is 
included in an enclosure around the home, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area 
from observation”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (noting that “[w]hile [the curtilage] factors can be employed with reasonable certainty 
in the urban residential environment, the analysis does not necessarily carry over to most camping 
contexts”). 
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typically supports a finding of curtilage for spaces closer to the home (with 
decreasing likelihood of such a finding the further this space is from the 
actual home). However, urban spaces are, by definition, closer in 
proximity to each other than more suburban or rural dwellings. In theory, 
it should be easier to make a finding of curtilage in the area surrounding a 
tent in a city because the surrounding space is likely to be rather limited 
and nearby. 
The second factor—the nature of the use—is likely outside of the 
control of a homeless person because urban campers often live on land 
owned by a city or a religious entity.114 The resident of the tent likely has 
very little, if any, control over the use to which the area is put. If urban 
campers have no control over the area around the “home,” they also likely 
have no agency over the third factor—installing additional enclosures 
surrounding the purported curtilage area—nor are they likely to be able to 
afford materials for additional enclosures.115 Similarly, the fourth factor—
protecting the area from observation—will also be unsatisfied because it 
is likely that urban campers lack the authority or resources necessary to do 
so. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE MAKESHIFT DWELLINGS OF 
UNHOUSED PEOPLE AS “PRIVATE AFFAIRS” WORTHY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The Washington State Constitution provides broader protections 
against warrantless searches and seizures than the United States 
Constitution, particularly in the context of the home.116  In defining the 
scope of “private affairs” under Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington 
State Constitution, Washington courts consider three factors: “(1) the 
historical protections afforded to the privacy interest, (2) the nature of 
                                                     
 114. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, TENT CITY USA: THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICA’S HOMELESS ENCAMPMENTS AND HOW COMMUNITIES ARE RESPONDING 12 (2017), https:// 
www.nlchp.org/Tent_City_USA_2017 [https://perma.cc/5QSS-3XX6]. 
 115. One exception to this general observation would be an authorized homeless encampment, 
which often includes a surrounding fence. See IT TAKES A VILLAGE, supra note 47. Given that such 
encampments are typically home to dozens of individuals who claim their own tents or tiny homes, 
the surrounding fence encloses the entire community, rather than one individual’s living space, and 
may be more aptly compared to a gated residential community where the gate provides some degree 
of protection and privacy against outside visitors, but such protection is not specific to individual 
dwellings. 
 116. State v. Groom, 947 P.2d 240, 244 (Wash. 1997) (“Article I, section 7 is more protective of 
the home than is the Fourth Amendment, and the cases reflect the heightened constitutional protection 
afforded the home under the state constitution.”); see Justice Charles W. Johnson & Justice Debra L. 
Stephens, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2013 Update, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1581, 
1588 (2013) (update forthcoming 2019). 
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information potentially revealed from the intrusion, and (3) the 
implications of recognizing or not recognizing the asserted privacy 
interest.”117 The Pippin court engaged in this judicious and realistic 
analysis to conclude that both Mr. Pippin’s possessions and makeshift tent 
were constitutionally protected from unreasonable searches.118 
Under the first factor, the court noted that while there may not have 
been any historical protections specifically afforded to unhoused people in 
makeshift shelters, historical protection of the home as well as relatively 
recent developments in Washington State Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and the state legislature “guide[] the trajectory of [its] article I, section 7 
analysis.”119 In 1998, the Washington State Supreme Court held that “the 
closer officers come to intrusion into a dwelling, the greater the 
constitutional protection”120 and that the principle of protecting the home 
against government invasions has historical roots that predate the founding 
of this country.121 More recently, the state legislature passed the 
Homelessness Housing and Assistance Act, creating a “homeless client 
management information system” to collect and maintain data about 
homeless individuals for use by service providers, but the Act requires 
informed consent from the unhoused individual prior to collecting such 
information.122 The Pippin court saw this Act as “convey[ing] a general 
respect for the privacy of homeless individuals’ personal information.”123 
Next, the Pippin court turned to the second factor noting that, absent 
dispositive historical protections, “the most important inquiry is whether 
the challenged action potentially reveals intimate details of a person’s 
life.”124 Here, the court transcended the limitations of traditional Fourth 
Amendment inquiry to the broader Article I, Section 7 analysis to include 
personal information. It noted that Article I, Section 7 protects the 
“intimate details of a person’s life,” such as “beliefs or associations, 
whether familial, political, religious, or sexual, as well as . . . intimate or 
personally embarrassing information.”125 
                                                     
 117. State v. Pippin, 403 P.3d 907, 913 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 118. Id. at 917. 
 119. Id. at 913–14. 
 120. Id. at 913 (quoting State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. 1998)). In fact, Washington 
State goes even further in protecting against government intrusions into the home: it is a gross 
misdemeanor “for any police officer or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling 
house or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant issued upon a complaint as by 
law provided.” WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.040 (2018). 
 121. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 913; see also supra text accompanying note 1. 
 122. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.185C.180. 
 123. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 914. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 913–14; see also State v. Jorden, 156 P.3d 893, 897–98 (Wash. 2007) (holding that 
information contained in a hotel registry is a private affair under the state constitution because it 
“reveals intimate details of one’s life”). 
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The Pippin court also expanded the traditional definition of a home 
to include personal information and items, concluding that a home is “the 
type of property that secures an individual’s most personal possessions and 
conduct.”126 In conducting its analysis, the court examined the similarities 
and differences between Mr. Pippin’s tent and a dwelling. Noting that the 
Supreme Court clearly ruled that “an individual can have a privacy interest 
in a place other than a traditional home and . . . society must allow some 
place where individuals are free from unreasonable searches,”127 and also 
noting that other courts had recognized “zones of privacy for homeless 
individuals by finding that their closed baggage and containers are 
protected because it would reveal their personal matters,”128 the court 
reasoned that: 
the more Pippin’s tent served as a refuge or retreat from the outside 
world, the more it could be the repository of objects or information 
showing his familial, political, religious, or sexual associations or 
beliefs, and the more it could contain objects intimately connected 
with his person, then the more his tent and the belongings within 
should be considered part of his private affairs under article I, 
section 7.129 
Because Mr. Pippin’s tent afforded him “one of the most 
fundamental activities which most individuals enjoy in private—sleeping 
under the comfort of a roof and enclosure” and “a modicum of separation 
and refuge from the eyes of the world: a shred of space to exercise 
autonomy over the personal”—the court held that “Pippin’s tent was the 
sort of closed-off space that typically shelters the intimate and discrete 
details of personal life protected by article I, section 7.”130 
Finally, the Pippin court turned to the third factor. In analyzing the 
implications of recognizing a privacy interest here, the court considered 
“the nature and extent to which police learned about a person’s personal 
contacts and associations as a result of the government conduct.”131 
Because the most important factor in this inquiry is personal information, 
                                                     
 126. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 914. 
 127. Id. 
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence 
from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the 
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—worth protecting from encroachment. 
A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public 
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s 
castle. 
Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 n.4 (1961)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 916. 
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the court focused on whether police conduct would expose intimate 
information. The court noted that this analysis turns on “the extent to 
which the subject matter is voluntarily exposed to the public . . . and 
consideration of the purpose served by the State’s action.”132 
Importantly, the court rejected the argument that Mr. Pippin had 
“voluntarily” exposed his personal details by camping in public.133 Here, 
the court relied on the findings of the Homelessness Housing and 
Assistance Act, listing myriad causes of homelessness.134 The court 
concluded that 
[a]gainst this backdrop, to call homelessness voluntary, and thus 
unworthy of basic privacy protections is to walk blind among the 
realities around us. Worse, such an argument would strip those on the 
street of the protections given the rest of us directly because of their 
poverty. Our constitution means something better.135 
The court further noted that even though the police had a legitimate 
purpose in enforcing public camping regulations, it was “only a feather in 
the balance against ensuring the privacy of the intimate and personal 
details that lie at the heart of article I, section 7.”136 
The court’s assessment of whether Mr. Pippin’s tent should be 
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures was not based on 
“whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable,” but rather 
focused on “whether the ‘private affairs’ of an individual have been 
unreasonably violated.”137 This shift away from an “objective” 
reasonableness standard to focus instead on privacy and personal 
information more adequately responds to the lives of people experiencing 
homelessness: 
The law is meant to apply to the real world, and the realities of 
homelessness dictate that dwelling places are often transient and 
precarious. The temporary nature of Pippin’s tent does not undermine 
any privacy interest. Nor does the flimsy and vulnerable nature of an 
improvised structure leave it less worthy of privacy protections. For 
the homeless, those may often be the only refuge for the private in 
the world as it is.138 
                                                     
 132. Id. (citing State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 50–51 (Wash. 2002)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.185C.005 (2018); Pippin, 403 P.3d at 916. 
 135. Pippin, 403 P.3d at 917. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 912. 
 138. Id. at 915 (internal citations omitted).  
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CONCLUSION 
People experiencing homelessness are overly criminalized and 
consistently deprived of the privacy protections that housed people enjoy. 
All jurisdictions should embrace the court’s position in Pippin, finding 
constitutional protections for unhoused people living in tents, either by 
bolstering individual rights under state constitutions139 or by remodeling 
objective reasonable tests under federal constitutional law to better reflect 
our evolving society’s understandings of privacy.140 Unhoused people are 
owed at least a modicum of respect in the form of legal rights to privacy 
in the spaces that function as their homes. Traditional Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence fails to adequately protect unhoused people against 
government invasions, and constitutional protection should not turn on a 
person’s wealth and privilege. The Washington State Constitution leaves 
room for a more judicious and equitable analysis of privacy in one’s 
“private affairs” that can contemplate the reality of homelessness while 
preserving the animating values of limiting unreasonable government 
intrusions.141 The Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II 
employed a reasonable and humane analysis of Mr. Pippin’s makeshift 
dwelling before arriving at the conclusion that it was a protected space, 
and all jurisdictions should follow suit. 
                                                     
 139. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 499–500 (1977) (collecting cases where state courts have rejected Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in favor of more protective state constitutional provisions). 
 140. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-cite location information and police must obtain a 
warrant prior to collecting location information from third-party wireless carriers). 
 141. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
